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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Who Polices Child Abuse and Neglect on Military Enclaves Over Which the
Federal Government Exercises Exclusive Jurisdiction?

At the 1974 annual American Medical Association Conference a symposium was held on "Child Abuse and Neglect in the Military."' Although
exact figures were unknown, it was estimated that child abuse and neglect
incidents in the military were from two to three times that of the civilian
population. 2 It was also pointed out that the military would have to face
several major obstacles should it attempt to deal with this problem. For
instance, since state child abuse legislation was believed to be inapplicable
on military bases, a military child protection system would have to be
created. 3 Another problem stemmed from the fact that military courts cannot
take jurisdiction over civilians.4 Thus, state juvenile and district courts
would have to be utilized, even though state laws were thought to be invalid
on military reservations. 5 In short, it was made clear that although there was
a great need for children's protective service programs on the military bases,
no such programs existed. For these reasons, the symposium was concluded
with the recommendation that an official program be quickly implemented6
in the military for the treatment and prevention of child abuse and neglect.
In response to this problem, the United States Army issued Army Regulation 600-48, Army Child Advocacy Program (ACAP), effective February 1,
1976. 7 ACAP provides for military programs designed to prevent and
control child abuse and neglect in families living within the military command. These programs are implemented by well-trained military personnel
operating in a coordinated system composed of three units: (1) medical
personnel, 8 (2) child protection and case management teams, 9 and (3) the
child advocacy/human resources council. 10 Its stated objectives include
prevention and control of child maltreatment,"I management of child mall.A

REPORT OF A SYMPOSIUM ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE MILITARY,

1974 AMA

Conference, Dr. Ray E. Heifer, Moderator.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; JUVENILE JUSTICE, May, 1975, at 11.
6. Id.
7.

ARMY CHILD ADVOCACY PROGRAM,

ACAP].
8. Id.at
9. Id.at
10. Id.at
11. Id.at

Army Reg. 600-48 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

§ III, 13,b.
§ II, 10.
II, 11.
§ I, 2,c.
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treatment cases among Army families,1 2 and coordinating military and3
civilian programs that impact on children's growth and development.'
Underlying ACAP is the idea that a good family life affects the performance
of a soldier, which in turn affects the morale, discipline, and health of the
command.' 4 This is one reason that social development and health of
children of Army families are matters of concern to all commanders.
Somewhat similar to ACAP is the North Carolina Child Abuse Reporting
Law, passed in 1971.15 Its primary purpose is to require that reports of child
abuse and neglect be made to the local Departments of Social Services
(D.S.S.). 16 This assures that any children suspected of being abused or
neglected will be identified and that protective services will be made
available to such children.' 7 The Act further requires the director of social
services receiving a report of child abuse or neglect to make a prompt and
thorough investigation and evaluation of the case. 1 8 Normally, this requires
a visit to the home of the child suspected to be neglected or abused. If
removal of the child from the home seems necessary for the protection of the
child, the director shall sign a juvenile petition to invoke the juvenile
jurisdiction of the district court. 19
It is the purpose of this note to examine Army Regulation 600-48 in
relation to the North Carolina Child Abuse Reporting Law. 20 The specific
questions to be answered are: (1) Whether the North Carolina Child Abuse
Reporting Law is applicable to civilian dependents of Army personnel
inhabiting a military base over which the federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction; and (2) if so, in what manner might the administration of this
law be limited by the Army? This is an area of law that is relatively new to
North Carolina, since the North Carolina Act was not enacted until 197121
and ACAP in 1976.22 Although no North Carolina cases directly dealing
with this issue exist, there has been a great deal of uncertainty as to the
rights of civilians living on federal enclaves to state services and to the duty
of state authorities to provide them those services in other jurisdictions. 2 3
Ordinarily the acquisition by the United States of exclusive territorial
jurisdiction assumes the absence of any interference with the exercise of the
12. Id. at § 1,2,d.
13. Id. at § 1,2,a.
14. Id. at § 1,4,a.
15.

N.C. GEN. STAT.

§§

110-115 through 110-122 (1975).

16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-116 (1975).
17. Id.

18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-119 (1975).
19. Id.at (2)(b); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-279 (Supp. 1975).
20. Supra, note 15.
21. Id.
22. Supra, note 7.
23. Whitfield, Rights of FederalEnclave Residents to State Residents Benefits, 49 CALIF. L.
REV. 550, 551 (1961).
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EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
functions of the federal government. 24 However, as Mr. Justice Reed stated
in James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99 (1940):
The Constitution does not command that every vestige of the laws
of the former sovereignty must vanish. On the contrary its language
has long been interpreted so as to permit the continuance until
abrogated of those rules existing at the time of the surrender of
sovereignty which govern the rights of the occupants of the territory
transferred. This assures that no area however small
will be left
25
without a developed legal system for private rights.
Furthermore, where a particular statute has not been enacted prior to the
transfer of sovereignty, but where "the basic state laws or

.

. . scheme for

guaranteeing the welfare of the individuals residing in the area antedates the
jurisdictional transfer, changes in the regulatory means of implementing the
basic scheme should not
preclude the state's exercise of jurisdiction in the
26
area of law involved."
The first question to consider is whether the North Carolina Child Abuse
Reporting Law is applicable on a military base under exclusive federal
jurisdiction. Since the United States obtained exclusive jurisdiction over the
lands comprising Ft. Bragg between 1919 and 1943,27 and the North
Carolina Child Abuse Reporting Law was not enacted until 1971,28 it would
appear that the North Carolina law would not apply there. However, a
convincing argument could be made that this North Carolina law is an
outgrowth of several related statutes29 concerning the processing of juvenile
cases, 30 the providing of juvenile services, 31 and criminal sanctions for child
abusers. 32 These related statutes antedate 1920, before most of Ft. Bragg
became subject to federal jurisdiction. On this basis alone it seems that the
North Carolina law is applicable at Ft. Bragg.
However, a stronger reason exists to support this belief. "[T]he particular
field of domestic relations, including the adjudication as to the custody of an
abused and neglected child, is exclusively one belonging to the states, not to
the federal government." 33 Except in rare instances, where a state does not
accept jurisdiction over a juvenile, 34 federal courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding. 3 Furthermore, recent congression24. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 267 (1963); 41 N.C. ATr'y GEN. 581 (1971).
25. James Stewart and Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99 (1940).
26. 41 N.C. Arr'Y GEN. 580, 581 (1971); see also Paul, supra, at 269.
27. Inventory Report on Jurisdictional Status of Federal Areas within the State as of June
30, 1962, at 575.
28. Supra, note 15.
29. 41 N.C. ATr'Y GEN. 582 (1971).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-277 through 7A-289 (Supp. 1975).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-22, 23 (1975).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (Supp. 1975).
33. Supra, note 29, at 581; Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1889).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1974).
35. Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1889); 41 N.C. Arr'Y GEN. 580, 581 (1971).
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al legislation indicates a strong federal policy to support child abuse and
neglect prevention and treatment programs through state agencies. 3 6 Thus, it
seems clear that the North Carolina law is not in conflict with any federal
legislation.
In the past, however, federal enclave inhabitants were often denied many
benefits of state laws such as voting in state elections, using state courts to
obtain a divorce, and benefiting from state poor relief laws. 37 These denials
were based on three primary arguments: 38 (1) The grant of state residency
benefits would be incompatible with the exclusive federal jurisdiction over
the enclave, (2) Enclave residents do not automatically become state residents, (3) Enclave inhabitants are not subject to the burdens of state residency. Gradually, as these arguments have fallen there has emerged a general
39
trend to grant residency benefits to state inhabitants.
One case following this trend is Board of County Freeholdersv. McCorkle, 98 N.J. Super. 451, 237 A.2d 640 (1968), in which the New Jersey
Superior Court declared that state laws relating to the providing of welfare
services for children (care and guardianship of dependnent children), and to
the commitment of the mentally ill to state hospitals were applicable to
persons living on military bases under exclusive federal jurisdiction. In this
case Burlington County, plaintiff, sought a declaratory judgment that such
state services were inapplicable to the inhabitants of Ft. Dix. The State of
New Jersey and the United States, through an amicus curiae brief, contended that these state services did apply to residents and nonresidents alike on
the base. The court declared that application of these New Jersey laws did
not interfere with the federal government's exercise of exclusive jurisdiction
on the military base. These laws were applicable to all on-base inhabitants,
whether residents of the state or not. Thus, the state was empowered to take
custody of dependent children and the mentally ill who lived on the military
base. Although this case was decided prior to the enactment of ACAP, it
should be controlling as to appropriate state welfare services on a military
base.
The next question to consider is whether the North Carolina Child Abuse
Reporting Act has been "abrogated" ' by ACAP. Although both the North
Carolina law and ACAP purport to provide protective services to the same
children, this constitutes no conflict. As mandated by ACAP the case
management team's activities and procedures must conform to the law. 4
Whether Army personnel must report incidents of child maltreatment to civil
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397(3), 1397(a) (Supp. IV. 1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (Supp. 1970); 42

U.S.C. § 620 (Supp. IV. 1970); 42 U.S.C. § 652 (Supp. IV. 1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2996 F(b)(4)
(Supp. IV. 1970).

37.
38.
39.
40.

Supra, note 23, at 551.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 552.
Supra, note 25.

41.

Army Reg. 600-48, § II, 8.d.1 (1976).
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authorities will depend on state law. 42 Army attorneys must provide guidance to Army personnel on the scope of authority state officials may
exercise over dependents residing on base. 43 In short, ACAP mandates that
the Army follow state child protection statutes. It emphasizes close coordination with state agencies in this area.44 In this way, ACAP's underlying
concept4 5 of improving the soldier's family life which, in turn, affects the
health of the command, will be enhanced. It should also be remembered that
only North Carolina courts, not military courts, can take juvenile juris46
diction over neglected and abused children physically present in this state.
Therefore, absence of North Carolina law would leave military bases without a developed legal system for the adjudication of children's rights. Such a
result would clearly be in violation of the language and spirit of Sadrakula,
supra.
The last question to consider is whether the administration of the Child
Abuse Reporting Law 48 (in-home investigations, child removals, etc.) by
state authorities on military bases can be limited by military authorities. As
stated in the Sadrakula case: "[T]he authority of state laws or their administration may not interfere with the carrying out of a national purpose. Where
the enforcement of state law would handicap efforts to carry out the plans of
the United States, the state enactment must, of course, give way.", 49 Yet,
this question involves more than a possible conflict between the military and
North Carolina. It involves the possible conflict of two federal policies: (1)
The policy to provide child's protective services to all children through state
agencies; 50 and (2) the policy of having the base commander exclude
from
5
the base any persons inimical to security, discipline, and morale. 1
It has long been recognized that a military base commander has the
authority to summarily exclude from the base any persons he believes to be
inimical to the morale, discipline, or loyalty of his troops. 52 Nevertheless,
although the base commander has wide discretion in this area, he cannot act
invidiously, irrationally, or arbitrarily. 53 Although it is unquestioned that a
commander can place restrictions on access to the base by civilians,5 4 the
42. Army Reg. 600-48, § II, 8.d.2 (1976).
43. Army Reg. 600-48, § 11, 8.d.3 (1976).
44. Army Reg. 600-48, § 1.2.a., 5.b § II. 10.c.8.c., § 111,12 (1976).
45.

Supra, note 14.

46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-279 (Supp. 1975); Spence v. Durham, 16 N.C. App. 372, 194
S.E.2d 216 (1972); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
47. Supra, note 25.
48. Supra, note 15.
49. Supra, note 25, at 103, 104.
50. Supra, note 36, Board of Chosen Freeholders v. MeCorkle, 98 N.J. Super. 451, 237
A.2d 640 (1968); Board of County of Commissioners v. Donoho, 144 Colo. 321, 356 P.2d 267
(1960).
51. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
52. Id.
53. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
54. Supra, note 50.
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extent of any restrictions in relation to the carrying out of state law has not
yet been decided.
In the recent case of Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) the base
commander of Ft. Dix, pursuant to base regulations banning speeches and
partisan political demonstrations, denied permission for a candidate for the
U.S. Presidency to hold a political rally on base. Ft. Dix was an "open"
base over which the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction. The
Court reasoned that although the public was allowed freely to visit the base,
it did not necessarily follow that the base had become a public forum for first
amendment purposes. It was held that the federal government retained the
power to preserve property under its control for the proper purpose for
which it was lawfully dedicated. In this instance, that purpose was to train
soldiers, not to provide a public forum for partisan political rallies.
Clearly then, a base commander has the authority to exclude from base
any social worker whose actions become a clear danger to the loyalty,
discipline, or morale of the troops of his command. 55 However, it seems
highly improbable, that on-base investigations by state authorities of suspected cases of abuse or neglect would be recognized as a threat to troop
loyalty, discipline, or morale by a court of law. This is because it would
often be impossible to identify maltreated children without investigations in
the homes on base by social workers. Since the underlying idea of ACAP is
to identify, prevent and control child maltreatment 56-which will improve
the soldier's family life-which, in turn, affects the morale, discipline and
health of the command 5 7-the administration of the protective services
program by state authorities on military bases serves, not as a threat, but as
an aid to the overall good health of the command. Similar reasoning was
used by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Arapahoe County Board of
Public Welfare v. Donoho. 58 In that case Arapahoe County contended that
on-base investigations of military base inhabitants, who were seeking state
poor relief benefits, might be frustrated by military authorities. The court
reasoned that since that welfare program was contemplated by federal
statute, it would be illogical for the federal government (meaning military
59
authorities) to interfere with county officials carrying out such a program.
This is further substantiated by the federal government's filing of an amicus
curiae brief, in the McCorkle case contending that children living at Ft. Dix
were entitled to all services provided by the New Jersey Bureau of Children's Services, including the "care, custody, guardianship, maintenance,
and protection of children. "6
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Supra, note 52.
Army Reg. 600-48, § 1.2.c (1976).
Id. at § 1.4.a.
144 Colo. 321, 356 P.2d 267 (1960).
Id. at 331, 356 P.2d at 274.
Board of Chosen Freeholders v. McCorkle, 98 N.J. Super. 451, 455, 237 A.2d 640

(1968).
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EXPERT MEDICAL OPINION EVIDENCE
Although Donoho and McCorkle indicate that administration of state law
on military bases does not interfere with federal law, they are limited in that
they involve only state and county governments; not the military. It must be
remembered that no cases exist which directly involve the extent to which a
base commander can regulate children's protective service activity by state
personnel on base. The cases previously alluded to simply state that (before
the enactment of ACAP) where federal funds partially support state child
welfare programs, those states must also provide child welfare services to
children residing on military bases. But, from all indications, it seems that
the carrying out of such programs does not interfere with the military.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that exclusive jurisdiction does not mean absolute jurisdiction in
all areas of law. The subject of child abuse and neglect belongs to the laws
of the states and not to the federal government. However, state administration of these laws on a military base is subject to regulation by the base
commander, in the interests of discipline and security. Although the extent
to which military restrictions on state authorities on base is not clear, it
seems certain that full proscription of such state activity would not be
supported by a court of law. State social workers have a right and a duty to
provide children's protective services on military bases.
WILLIAM

D.

ACTON, JR.

Expert Medical Opinion Evidence in North Carolina:
In Search of a Controlling Precedent
I.

INTRODUCTION

The common-law system of proof has always been rigid and demanding
in its insistence upon the most reliable source of information in a given case;
particularly when the testimony is that of an expert medical witness.' In
North Carolina, and most other jurisdictions, this policy has resulted in the
gradual development of highly complex evidentiary rules relating to the
admissibility of opinion and hearsay evidence by qualified experts.2 Although his value as an expert 3 is desired by the courts because of his superior
I. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 11013 (2d ed. 1972). (hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK)

2.

Id. at §§ 13-15.

3. Qualification as an expert is largely a question of fact and ordinarily within the
exclusive province of the trial judge. Qualifications are not rigid. "It is enough that, through
study or experience, or both, he has acquired such skill that he is better qualified than the jury
to form an opinion on the particular subject." (Citations omitted) I STANSBURY'S NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE 429 (Brandis Revision, 1973). (hereinafter referred to as STANSBURY)
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